This article brings to the fore the shortcomings of the type of pluralism advocated by John Rawls both in Political Liberalism and in The Law of Peoples. It is argued that by postulating that the discrimination between what is and what is not legitimate is dictated by rationality and morality, Rawls’s approach forecloses recognition of the properly political moment. Exclusions are presented as being justified by reason and the antagonistic dimension of politics is not acknowledged. This article also takes issue with Rawls’s ‘realistic utopia’, asserting that despite the reference to ‘decent’ hierarchical societies, it amounts to a universalization of the western liberal model.
via ppe.sagepub.com
We discussed this interesting article at a political philosophy discussion group at the University of Sydney earlier this week. I was interested in Mouffe's efforts to get around the technocratic, passionless implications of Rawls's theory. Can you have a liberal democracy that can include people who are not believers in liberal democracy? It's a question that has relevance in today's 'politics of the centre'. Mouffe argues that the absence of the adversary in today's western democracies (aka decline of the socialist left) has contributed to disengagement and to the rise of the right because these fringe parties are the only ones offering real choice.
I wasn't totally convinced by some of Mouffe's criticisms of Rawls or of her attempted resolution of the problem, but it is highly thought-provoking.
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